As I understand it, C&S work was being done on CSX's Columbia Subdivision when Amtrak 91 collided with unattended locomotives and multi-rack auto carriers placed on the siding across from an automobile loading/unloading facility.
As I understand it, the CTC/automatic block signal system had been taken out of service so upgrades for future PTC operation could be installed.
I understand that some variant of manual blocking of trains, "DTC," was in effect. I think I understand that this is a version of TWC employing "Form D Control System" lines 2 and 6, or perhaps lines 2, 6, and 7, to maintain the safe separation of trains.
I understand that the block in which #91 received authority to operate was known as "Gaston," and extended (north to south) from S 363.5 to S 374.6. I understand, according to an old timetable that might be out-of-date, that this block contains eleven (11) hand thrown switches on the single-track main line.
I understand that the siding where the CSX freight equipment was parked extended from S 367.0 to S 367.9, and that the switches connecting either end of the siding to the main track were hand thrown switches equipped with electric locks.
I understand that before authorizing #91 to enter the block, the dispatcher had to know the block was clear of all other movements and the switches were lined and locked for "normal," operation on the main track.
I understand that with the signal system out-of-service, there was no signal protection to communicate the position of the switch to the crew of #91.
I understand how important proper handling of switches is in non-signaled territory. You probably do, too, particularly if you were around in 2005; particularly if you've ever heard of Graniteville, South Carolina, where an improperly lined switch in non-signaled territory precipitated a collision that ruptured a tank car carrying chlorine, releasing 60 tons, resulting in the deaths of nine people.
FRA, to its credit, issued Emergency Order 24 regarding the operation of main track switches, ordering railroads to, where such switches are used in non-signaled territory, require employees operating these switches to complete a Switch Position Awareness Form (SPAF). The form required the employees to record the time a switch was reversed; the time the switch was finally returned to the normal position; the initials of the employee handling the switch; and the conductor's signature when the form was complete.
And I understand why, despite all the moaning and groaning (including my own), FRA stood by its EO, amending it to make it a bit more comprehensive and flexible, but keeping the essential requirements.
To my knowledge, I understand EO 24 remains in effect; and I understand that CSX requires its crews to utilize a SPAF. According to a CSX operating rules document, employees must:
Record on the switch position awareness form the time switches were opened and time the switches were restored to normal.
I also understand that #91, having received authority to enter the block would have been operating at or near 59 mph, the MAS for non-signaled operation.
Now as I understand it, since #91 enters the block at subdivision milepost 363.5, the crew using the switch and the siding to set out the autoracks must have reported "clear" of the block with the switches lined and locked for normal main track operation, at least four (4) minutes prior to #91 entering the siding, assuming of course that the crew was handling and responsible for their own switches.
And, again, I understand that these are unusual circumstances.
So... so what I cannot understand is why, in these unusual circumstances, when there is no signal protection for a hand thrown main track electric-lock switch, you, meaning a railroad, would allow any employee other than a qualified employee of the signal department to operate the switches? Sure, you might think you could designate a train service employee to act as a switch-tender, but the determining condition here is that the signal system has been removed from service. The full meaning of that unusual operating circumstance might escape the understanding of the average train service employee. It will not escape the understanding of the average qualified signal department employee.
I understand that in unusual operating circumstances, we need to deploy other than usual operating personnel.
David Schanoes
February 5 2018
Deckard: What do you want?
K: I want to ask you some questions. --Blade Runner 2049
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