The facts of the matter are bad enough. On December 1, 2013, the locomotive engineer operating Metro-North train 8808 entered the curve MP 11.5 at approximately 82 mph, 52 mph above the maximum authorized speed for passenger trains.
The locomotive engineer spilled his train all over the railroad and down an embankment. Four were killed and sixty one others injured. Bad enough? It doesn't get any worse than that.
In 2016, the locomotive engineer operating train 8808 sued Metro North Railroad for not installing technology that would have protected him from.......himself. He sued, seeking $10 million in damages for pain and suffering resulting from.....his failure to properly discharge his duties.
Metro-North petitioned the court to have the locomotive engineer's suit dismissed. A month or so ago, the federal judge authorized the suit to go forward, noting "this case cries out for settlement."
This case does not cry out for settlement. It did cry out for summary dismissal.
The basis for the engineer's claim is that:
(1)Metro-North knew that the curve at Spuyten Duyvil presented a threat to the safety of passengers and employees;
(2) that a previous incident some 8 years earlier in 2005 alerted Metro-North to the risk that overspeed in this curve presented;
(3) that an operating officer of Metro-North presented a proposal for the application of automatic speed control technology that would have prevented, in most cases, overspeed violations;
(4)that the Senior Vice-President, Operations rejected the proposal, and in so doing...
(5) the railroad failed in its obligation to provide a safe environment for passengers and employees.
All righty then, smooth and by the numbers:
(1)no, the curve at Spuyten Duyvil did not present a threat to safety of passengers and employees, provided the person operating the locomotive complied with the authorized speed for operating through the curve.
(a)toward that end, Metro-North trained its locomotive engineers on the physical characteristics and applicable speed restrictions for operating trains on the Hudson line. The Hudson line has more than 30 locations requiring changes in speed, either acceleration or deceleration, by the locomotive engineer. The locomotive engineers cannot be certified as engineers, and are not allowed to perform service without demonstrating, in the actual operating environment, recognition and compliance with these speed changes.
(b)toward that end, Metro-North supervisors perform operating and efficiency testing of train and engine crews, monitoring compliance with permanent and temporary speed restrictions, among many other things. Supervisors use radar, event recorder data, and even the old-fashioned stop watch to make these observations.
(c)toward that end Metro-North supervisors perform "check rides" with locomotive engineers, observing among many other things, compliance with speed restrictions.
(2)no, the incident in 2005 did not "alert" Metro-North to the risks of overspeed in this curve, or other curves. Metro-North was always aware, hence the procedures adopted in (1) above that are in fact the general practices for every railroad in the country.
(a)every railroad has curves, bridges, changes in alignment that require locomotive engineers to decelerate trains.
(b)every railroad has locomotive engineers, whose job is entirely dedicated to properly controlling the speed of the train.
(c)if there were no need to control the speed of the train, there would have never been a need for locomotive engineers.
(3)yes, after the incident in 2005, the General Road Foreman of Engines proposed "pushing" or forcing a medium cab signal code into the rails of the curve, which would automatically enforce a 30 mph maximum speed. I know this because I discussed the proposal with the GRFE, and supported his proposal
(4)yes, the Senior Vice-President of Operations rejected the proposal, a decision with which I disagreed then, and I disagree now.
(5)no, in making that decision, the Sr. VP-O did not fail in his obligation to preserve and maintain a safe operating environment for passengers and employees.
(a)the linch-pin of safe train operations is that the operating personnel-- locomotive engineers, conductors, train dispatchers-- themselves are the critical component of a safe operating environment.
(b) the locomotive engineer is not simply the employee of the railroad, he or she is its agent, the person charged with delivering the service as efficiently and safely as conditions permit.
(c)no condition created by the railroad, or its Sr. VPO required the locomotive engineer to exceed the authorized speed for the curve.
(d)the schedule did not require the locomotive engineer to overspeed.
(e) the equipment did not fail to properly respond to actions intended to accelerate or decelerate the train.
Leading us to:
(6)the failure was the failure of the locomotive engineer himself to ensure a proper and safe operating environment as he was trained and obligated to do. The railroad did not fail and damage the locomotive engineer. The locomotive engineer failed and damaged the railroad.
The decision to apply or not apply any specific technology does not automatically mean a railroad is more safe or less safe. How do we know this? We know this because over 200,000 southward train movements operated through this curve without derailing between the incident in 2005 and the derailment in 2013.
We know this because automatic speed control systems fail. When I worked at MNR, I calculated speed control on locomotives failed approximately once in every 1500 train movements. At that rate, over the 8 years, 133 trains would have had to operate through the curve without speed control.
The railroad would not have terminated those trains prior to operation through the curve. Rather the railroad would have allowed the trains to continue to destination under the same principle that governs all movement on the railroad: the locomotive engineer will comply with the rules that govern the maximum permissible speed of the train under the given conditions.
Now the damage from allowing this suit to move forward can be catastrophic. One can imagine, without much effort, a train dispatcher improperly releasing a track block and allowing a train to enter a zone where maintenance of way employees are working, resulting in injury to those workers.
The dispatcher then sues the railroad for not installing technology that prevents him or her from improperly releasing the track block, despite the fact that it is precisely the dispatcher's responsiblity to properly protect maintenance workers.
And PTC? What about those railroads, and sections of railroads where FRA has determined PTC is not required? Imagine a locomotive engineer violating a stop signal indication and colliding with another train. That locomotive engineer survives and then sues the railroad for not installing PTC on that section of track even though it was specifically exempted by the regulatory body.
MNR may think it's wiser to settle this case without trial, avoiding the risk of leaving this decision to a jury. In actuality, the railroad has no choice but to accept that risk. The industry cannot afford the price of a settlement.
David Schanoes
May 10,2019
I'm from the, uh, Confidential Committee on Moral Abuses. --Deckard, Blade Runner
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