When Failing to Regulate Is (or could be) Worse than a Disservice; It’s a Threat to Public Safety
by: William Keppen, Transportation Safety Advocate
The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) made a shocking announcement this past week. It announced the withdrawal of the Advance
Notice of Proposed Rule Making (ANPRM) on “Evaluation of Safety Sensitive Personnel for Moderate-to-Severe Obstructive Sleep Apnea” (OSA). This withdrawal is being made despite the numerous train collisions and
derailments, caused by OSA, dating back to the head-on collision of two CN/IC freight trains near Clarkston, Michigan in 2001.
Following its investigation of that tragic incident, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), NTSB issued the following recommendation to FRA:
Develop a standard medical examination form that includes questions regarding sleep problems and require that the form be used, pursuant to 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 240, to determine the medical fitness of locomotive engineers; the form should also be available for use to determine the medical fitness of other employees in safety-sensitive positions. (R-02-24)
Subsequently, there have been eleven other train collisions or derailments that NTSB has attributed directly to train crew fatigue and obstructive sleep apnea (OSA). Three more, including the New Jersey Transit (NJT) Hoboken Station and the Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) Atlantic Terminal station platform
over-runs, bear the earmarks of fatigue/OSA related incidents.
Think about this; sixteen years since NTSB Recommendation R-02-24 was issued to FRA and FRA has yet to take effective actions to eliminate the public and workplace safety risks that are so clearly associated with train crew fatigue and medical fitness-for-duty.
The trail of death and destruction is long and bloody:
• November 15, 2001, two CN/IC trains collide head-on. One engineer and one conductor sustain fatal injuries, two others sustain serious, but non-fatal injuries. (OSA)
• December 13, 2001, an eastbound UP train strikes the rear-end of another eastbound UP train. Four train crew members suffer non-fatal injuries. (Train crew fatigue.)
• October 21, 2002, two UP trains collide head-on. Two train crew members suffer non-fatal injuries. (Train crew fatigue.)
• November 15, 2003, a UP train strikes the side of a BNSF train. Two train crew members suffer non-fatal injuries. (OSA)
• February 21, 2004, two UP train collide head-on. Two train crew members suffer fatal injuries, two others suffer non-fatal injuries. (Train crew fatigue.)
• June 28, 2004, a UP train strikes the side of a BNSF train. The conductor of the UP train and two local residents suffered fatal injuries.
• July 10, 2005, two CN/IC trains collide head-on. Four train crew members suffer fatal injuries. (Train crew fatigue/OSA.)
• November 10, 2007, an eastbound UP train strikes the rear-end of another eastbound UP train. Two train crew members suffer fatal injuries. (Train crew fatigue.)
• April 17, 2011, an eastbound BNSF train strikes the rear-end of another eastbound
BNSF train. Two train crew members suffer fatal injuries. (OSA)
• May 25, 2013, a UP train strikes the side of a BNSF train. Two train crew members suffer non-fatal injuries. (OSA)
• December 1, 2013, a Metro North commuter train enters a 30 mph speed restricted curve at 82 mph. The engineer suffers non-fatal injuries. Four passengers suffer fatal injuries, sixty-one others suffer non-fatal injuries. (OSA)
• August 17, 2014, two UP trains collide head-on. Two train crew members suffered fatal
injuries, two others suffered non-fatal injuries. (Train crew fatigue/OSA.)
• June 28, 2016, two BNSF trains collide head-on. Three train crew members suffered fatal injuries, one other suffered non-fatal injuries. (The NTSB investigation is on-going; however, signal and brake system failures have been ruled out. It seems highly probable that this may be an OSA related incident.)
• September 29, 2016, an NJT commuter train over-runs the Hoboken Station platform at twice the authorized speed. One person on the station platform suffered fatal injuries, 110 passengers suffered non-fatal injuries. (The NTSB investigation is on-going, however, subsequent to the derailment, the engineer of the train was diagnosed with severe sleep apnea.)
• November 16, 2016, two CSX trains collide head-on. Two train crew members suffer non-fatal injuries. (The NTSB investigation is on-going, however, the engineer of the striking train told NTSB investigations that he had fallen asleep prior to the collision.)
• January 4, 2017, an LIRR commuter train over-runs the Atlantic Terminal station
platform at twice the authorized speed. Over one hundred passengers suffer non-fatal injuries. (The NTSB investigation is on-going, however, the engineer of the train has informed the NTSB that he did not recall events from the time the train approached Atlantic Terminal, until the time of the derailment. NTSB may determine that OSA or some other sort of medical event may have contributed to this incident.)
Fact - every form of transportation in the US, other than railroads, has comprehensive medical
fitness for duty regulations. For them, fatigue/OSA caused accidents are rare events.
FRA has stubbornly refused to impose similar regulations, and here are the results of this “hands off” lack of policy since 2001:
• Eighteen engineers and conductors have suffered fatal injuries.
• Two “local residents” have suffered fatal injuries as a result of one of these collisions.
• Five commuter train customers have suffered fatal injuries, while over 270 others have
suffered non-fatal injuries.
It seems clear, at least to me, that we have a situation where a failure to regulate is, in-fact, the opposite of “due diligence.” It is a dereliction of duty and the violation of the public trust.
_______________________________________________
August 9, 2017
Dear Dr. Emo,
You were listed as the contact person at FRA regarding the withdrawal notice on the OSA rule making process. I, along with hundreds of others, commented during the ANPRM process, fully expecting FRA to move forward with the next step in the rule making process. To say that I and many others are disappointed, would be a gross understatement. This action follows the long history of FRA failing to address the public and workplace safety risks, associated with workplace fatigue and medical fitness-for-duty of safety sensitive railroad personnel. Please review the attached document and advise how the actions FRA has suggested in the notice will address the immediate safety risks associated with untreated OSA and other medical conditions.
Sincerely,
William C Keppen, Transportation Safety Advocate
_________________
David Schanoes
August 9, 2017
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