Ten90 Solutions LLC

I love the NTSB, maybe that's a surprise; maybe not.  I love the NTSB but probably not for the reasons normal people love the NTSB; not only because NTSB probes for weaknesses; not only because NTSB considers any and all factors that might contribute, no matter how marginally to an accident; not even because NTSB does what it's supposed to do-- which is to never take "no" for an answer.

I love the NTSB because of its persistent insistence, or is that insistent persistence, that the facts must conform to NTSB's desires; to NTSB's  expectations, and if the facts don't, there must be something wrong with the facts.   Case in point? 

Case in point: the latest email notification I received from the NTSB, advising me that the board had released is final report on the collision of a CSX westbound freight train H70211 with a CSX eastbound freight train W31411 near Carey, Ohio. 

You will recall, dear dedicated reader, that we discussed this accident in the  previous column.  The locomotive engineer of the westbound was impaired by alcohol when operating the locomotive. He had disengaged the PTC prior to the accident, and had tested positive for marijuana subsequent to the accident.  Of these three factors,  only one is not an operating rule violation; only one is a part of normal train operations; only one has precisely no bearing on the cause of the accident.  That one is disengaging the PTC, because in a current and safety approved configuration of PTC, the disengagement is required to allow reverse, and switching movements. 

However, in the NTSB's evaluation this configuration of PTC is a "probable contributory cause."  To wit: 

Probable Cause:

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the train collision near Carey, Ohio, was the failure of the westbound train engineer to respond to the signal indications requiring him to slow and stop the train prior to Control Point Springs because of his impairment due to the effects of alcohol. Contributing to the collision was the design of the positive train control system which allowed continued operation in restricted mode on the main track.  

Now someone who didn't love NTSB as much as I do might just dismiss this as nonsense or self-serving, since everybody already knows not all trains disengaging PTC to perform reverse movements will violate a stop signal indication and slam  into the side of another train. 

Somebody who doesn't love NTSB as  much as I do, might get seriously frosted to read the headline to NTSB's announcement:  

PTC-Preventable CSX Freight Train Collision Highlights Impairment Issues, Renews Calls for Recorders 

Somebody might point out that arguing that PTC is a contributing cause to an accident in PTC territory when the PTC is disengaged is missing the point-- said point being that PTC can prevent a high percentage of  human errors, but it will not and cannot prevent all human errors as long as  human beings are essential to train operations. 

Why would someone take such a harsh, uncompromising stance in opposition to NTSB's magical thinking?   I can only guess that someone might point out that PTC is a system, and a system has components and components fail and when components fail it is necessary to disengage that system in order to complete the train movement and completing the train movement with PTC disengaged is less dangerous to the requirements for network-wide safe train movements than terminating or suspending the train movement.

You don't believe me?  Ask anybody who has ever worked on railroad with cab signals but no wayside signals.  What's more dangerous when a train has a cab signal failure? Moving the train with the train's crew responsible for complying with the additional restrictions for movement, or letting the train sit there until the cab signals are repaired, or a locomotive with cab signals can reach the train and tow it  to a terminal? 

PTC components on locomotives will fail to initialize prior to entering PTC territory.  PTC components will malfunction on trains already operating in PTC territory.  PTC will be disengaged on trains with failures in order to move the train safely to a point of repairs and not obstruct the movement of other trains which can only exacerbate the risk to network operations. 

And if an accident occurs when moving that train with its PTC disengaged, what do we say: "PTC preventable accident caused by freight train crew operating with defective, disengaged PTC verifies PTC vulnerabilities"? 

Really? I would have never guessed.

So NTSB could have announced its final report on the accident with the headline, "Intoxicated engineer's failure to comply with operating rules highlights the limits to advanced technologies." Or "Crew preventable CSX freight train collision near Carey, Ohio highlights railroad's need to maintain rigorous disciplinary proceedings when principles of safe train operations are ignored."

But that's probably magical thinking.  Which gets us to the second thing...which is the reliability of PTC systems.  Coming up next, right here, very shortly, maybe tomorrow.

David Schanoes

October 22, 2020

Well, my temperature is rising, got my feet on the floor                           

Crazy people rocking 'cause  they want some more                   

Let me in baby, I don't know what you got 

But you better take it easy 'cause this place is hot

--Spencer Davis Group,

"Gimme Some Loving"