Ten90 Solutions LLC

Last night I received a phone call from a reporter who wanted to ask some questions.  We talked, and he said... 

..."You seem surprised that FRA allowed this service to operate without insisting on some form of automatic speed control." 

"Surprised barely begins to describe what I am."

"Well why is that surprising?  Few railroads in the US have any form of automatic speed control." 

"Because we had a fatal overspeed accident in passenger service in 2013; we had a fatal overspeed accident in passenger service in 2015; we have a fatal overspeed accident in passenger service in 2016; we now have a fatal overspeed accident in passenger in service in 2017, after FRA has issued two emergency orders, and a safety advisory.  I'm more than surprised that in overseeing the federal funding for this project FRA didn't insist that continuous automatic speed enforcement, including that of the timetable speed restrictions be included in the design and operating plan for this service."   

"So you blame the FRA for the accident?" 

"Absolutely not," I said. "I don't blame FRA." 

I don't, blame FRA that is, because blame has nothing to do with this.  Cause of the accident is the issue, not blame, and FRA did not cause the accident. 

Lack of automatic speed enforcement did not cause the accident. 

"Obsolete" or decrepit infrastructure did not cause the accident. 

Failure to deploy PTC did not cause the accident. 

A curve restricted to 30 mph following a 79 mph section of track did not cause this accident. 

Brake failure did not cause this accident.  There was no failure. 

Push-pull operation did not cause this accident. 

The cause of this accident was the failure to control the speed of the train. 

Again, how do we know this?  How do we determine cause?  We determine cause through a process of elimination. 

Again, the logic of safe train operations is if, then logic. If  train X has authority between A and B, then no other train or equipment can be awarded an authority that overlaps with X's authority.  If another train is provided with an overlap authority, then a collision will occur.

And if a collision doesn't occur?  Pure dumb luck and pure dumb luck is the enemy of system safety. 

We cannot say: If any train X is not operating in PTC mode around the I-5 overpass curve, then it will  derail. 

We cannot say: If any train X is operating in push-pull mode around that same curve without automatic speed enforcement, then it will derail.

We can say:  If  any train X operates at 80 mph around  that same curve, then it will always derail. 

And if a derailment doesn't occur?  See previous comment on pure dumb luck, substituting however, the word "miracle" for "dumb luck." 

Speed is the determining variable, and control of speed is the necessary constant. Failure to properly control the speed of the train is the cause of this accident.   

Now we can, and we should, cue, prompt, warn, reinforce,  supplement the human being responsible for controlling train speed with systems that are more constant than we know human beings to be.  That doesn't mean PTC exclusively, immediately, always. 

Cab signal/speed control systems can be enhanced and expanded to accomplish almost everything that PTC does without GPS, without digital radios, without WIU, without a database of the track geometry resident in the memory modules on board the locomotive. 

For example a 7 aspect cab signal speed control that incorporates a positive stop aspect can be configured to enforce train movements at 0 mph, 15 mph, 30 mph,  40 mph, 45 mph, 60 mph, a MAS of 80 mph, with a governor overspeed (maximum speed the train can achieve in the event of a "runaway" before triggering a  penalty brake application) of  110 mph.

Insulated joints and code transmitters can be installed at the approaches to  the permanently restricted areas and push the appropriate code (or code that is closest to, but does not exceed the authorized speed) into the rail, and the threat of overspeed is effectively eliminated.   

The positive stop feature enforces the 0 mph at stop signals. 

And here's the thing, the thing that kept me up last night, tossin' and turnin.'  When the Feds are trying to stimulate the economy by offering money to agencies corporations, governments, partnerships to expand, improve, renovate, rail service, why then wouldn't the Feds put some conditions on those grants-- conditions that advance the safe operation of trains in accordance with the regulatory body's explicit, and mandatory directives; the regulatory body's explicit and repeated recommendations regarding enhanced ATC?  Here we could establish the perfect case for, of, and by a funded mandate. 

That's not the only way we can prompt, cue, supplement and reinforce the locomotive engineer.  In this particular instance, the territory is a centralized traffic control system. 

We have a block signal system governing movement of trains in both directions on 1 or more tracks. 

We have interlockings where tracks converge and intersect each other.  There is  no reason why the approach to speed restricted areas cannot be identified by fixed wayside signals, along the railroad right of way, displaying a lighted signal requiring the locomotive engineer to slow her/his train.  At the 1-5 curve, a signal "distant" to the beginning of  the speed restriction would be installed, with the "home" signal located at the point of the restriction. 

The "home" signal would be capable of displaying only two indications: stop or a signal indicating "proceed not exceeding 30 mph."  The distant signal would be placed the distance required to decelerate the train from 80 mph to 0 mph. 

When the home signal displayed "stop," the distant signal would display a signal indication requiring the train to approach the next signal prepared to stop, and immediately begin the deceleration to 30 mph.

When the home signal displayed "proceed not exceeding 30 mph," the distant signal would display an indication "approach the next signal at a speed not exceeding 30 mph." 

The distant signal must also have the capability of displaying a signal indicating "proceed at restricted speed."

To be sure, this system doesn't include automatic enforcement, and does not eliminate the possibility of overspeeding, but lighted, fixed signals that might require a "stop" focus the mind better than a unlit permanent speed board. 

Now, none of this is all that complicated, but it's the simple things that keep me awake at night. 

I honestly cannot remember a three year period with fatal overspeed derailments in passenger service in each year,  prior to these last 3 years.

This keeps me up at night, too:  Will 2018 be any different?  Hell, I might as well go back and seek full-time employment.  I didn't sleep then either.

David Schanoes  12/20/2017 

"I couldn't sleep at all last night..."

Bobby Lewis, Tossin' and Turnin', 1961