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KEEP CALM AND...SHAKE

I do keep up with safety bulletins and reports from that side of the Atlantic. Since we're all dealing with the same laws of physics, and the same human frailties, we're bound to encounter similar problems that might just produce a novel solution, or failing that, a warning, like DON'T LET THIS HAPPEN TO YOU.

So I received this safety digest from the UK's Rail Accident Investigation Board (RAIB). I read it and it make me shiver and shake. You read it. You'll shiver and shake, too.

OK. Done reading? As we say over here in the US: "Here's the skinny."

1. Train 2T26 blows the signal displaying stop (this is called a "SPAD"-- signal passed at danger--in the UK) at location L93, Bethnal Green Station.

2. Train driver (called a locomotive engineer in the US) stops the train. Train driver is contacted by the signaller (called a block operator in the US) who is responsible for, and operating the interlocking at this location. The signaller tells the driver to keep calm and....don't turn a wheel.

3. The signaller is requested to tell the driver to contact his railway company's service controller, who does not have actual movement authority, due to the separation of the railway into Network Rail, a semi-(?)government body providing infrastructure services including dispatching, from the various private railway carriers who essentially "lease" slots, time/track expanses, from Network Rail.

4. The private railway carrier service controller (who is not what we call a dispatcher in the US), who does not possess movement authority, determines that the driver (engineer) is fit to continue service and gives the driver permission to continue the train's operation.

5. Meanwhile, the signaller (block operator) is able to line a route conflicting with the already established occupancy in the interlocking represented by 2T26's SPAD (stop signal violation). The signaller is able to authorize train 2T33 to proceed into the interlocking despite the conflict.

6. The driver (engineer) of 2T26, based on his discussion with the railway carrier service controller, and without communicating with the signaller, proceeds to move train 2T26 along the route conflicting with the route authorized for train 2T33.

7. The signaller (block operator) observes 2T26 moving and says out loud "Crikey!" which in the US is equivalent to "WTF?" or "Holy S#@t!"

8. Signaller (block operator) orders 2T26 to stop again, and prevents everything from going from shambolic to pear-shaped and worse.

When I was done shivering, and muttering "WTF?" and "Holy S%*t!" these questions emerged from the goose bumps occupying my brain:

1. How does a "service controller" determine from a remote location that a driver (engineer) is fit for service when the violation is of such severity and such a threat to the safety of the service, that the violation itself must be regarded as incontrovertible evidence that the employee is not fit for service?

2. How can the operating authority of the railway, the Network Rail "running controller" allow any other entity to determine whether or not it is safe to allow an employee to continue in service after a SPAD?

3. How can a driver (engineer) stopped in an interlocking by the person in charge of the interlocking, resume movement without permission from that person? Such an employee is clearly not fit for service.

4. How can a conflicting route be lined, and authorized for movement, in an interlocking?

Question 4 makes me shake the most, followed by question 2.

If I had any friends on the UK railways I'd ask him or her for the answers. But I don't... so I'll just keep calm and shake.

David Schanoes June 19, 2018

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dmschanoes@ten90solutions.com