A lot has happened recently. A CP train operating on the BNSF St. Paul Subdivision overran a stop signal, collided with a UP train, and the subsequent derailment of locomotives caused a lumber car in a BNSF consist to derail on an adjactent track. Bingo! Trifecta...
...or in railroad speak: "clusterf**%."
Then Amtrak #7 derailed near Joplin, Montana, operating within the authorized speed with PTC engaged, resulting in three fatalities.
And Amtrak announced the restoration of Cascades Service using the Point Defiance Bypass, four years after the initial revenue run ended in disaster.
Well, given my official status as dinosaur emeritus, I'll shake my thick head and utter "WTF?" in public, and in some sort of chronological order.
So first "W": the CP train had experienced a PTC failure back on the CP railroad before entering the BNSF territory. The failure could not be remedied and the train, with the PTC inoperative was handed off to the BNSF for movement to St. Paul.
CP couldn't correct the defect.
BNSF accepted the train with the defect.
FRA couldn't (and still can't) do anything about it because FRA is prohibited by law from doing anything about it. Per FRA:
The PTCEI Act, Congress declared that—from October 29, 2015 until one year after the last Class I railroad obtains PTC System Certification and finishes implementing a PTC system on all of its required lines—FRA cannot subject any railroad to the operational restrictions in 49 CFR §§ 236.567 or 236.1029 that would apply where a controlling locomotive experiences a PTC system failure, a PTC-operated consist is not provided by another railroad when provided in interchange, or a PTC system otherwise fails to initialize, cuts out, or malfunctions.
Can't do a thing. Can't even enforce a mandatory speed restriction. Until January 1, 2022:
Effective January 1, 2022, when a train encounters a failure (either Initialization or En-Route), the operational restrictions under 49 CFR §§ 236.567 and 236.1029 can be enforced. Effective January 1, 2023, if the PTC system fails to initialize at the designated Initial Terminal, the Unit must be repaired or replaced. This is in reference to both Host and Tenant based operations.
It's another year before a failure at an initial terminal disqualifies the train from main track movement. Swell. As the man said, "I feel safer already."
Except I don't. I hate to admit this, given my illustrious career as a terminal rat, but I actually have main track experience. I was the STO in the movement office of the New Jersey division of Conrail. And I was known to make main line swaps of power between road trains when one train reported defective power and had 115 miles to travel over our division before connecting to another division, and the other train with the good locomotives had only 20 miles left before terminating on my division.
I wasn't alone in this. All the STOs were prepared to do this. We talked about it. We shared delay times endured when making the swaps. Most of all, we all agreed it was our job; our responsibility. Regulation or no regulation, we weren't going to hand a through-train to another division with movement defects, much less a train control defect. So I have to wonder about an organization that dumps its heightened risk unto another railroad's railroad, not to mention a law that seems to facilitate that dumping.
That's one W.
Now for the second W: Amtrak #7, September 25, 2021 near Joplin, Montana. What have we learned since September 26? Not much, just that the train was not overspeeding, and that the PTC was engaged. What we don't know is the intended route of the train at the CP point. We don't know how the switch was lined.
Look at the aerial photograph in the NTSB report.
From west to east:
The locomotives and three cars appear to be upright and in line on the main track.
Car in position 6 (the 4th car) is upright and appears to be on rail on the siding.
Cars in positions 7,8, 9 are derailed on (or toward) the main track. Car in position 8 is derailed but upright. Car in position 9 is on its side.
All units, locomotives and cars in positions 1-9 are west of the switch providing access to the siding, indicating that the train was routed main to main. If so, how did the car in position 6 wind up on the siding?
Was it already rerailed by MofE personnel after derailing?
If so, why did that car derail to the south of the main track, toward the siding, when all other cars derail to the north of the main track?
Had the car derailed, then catching the switch point and splitting the switch, such that it continued toward the siding, while the three cars trailing behind it (derailed or not by that point) continued toward the main track?
Cars in position 10, 11, 12 are derailed to the north of the main track, on their sides, approximately (as best as I can estimate) 300 feet east of the switch providing access to the siding.
Across from position 12 there is a section of damaged track, where the south running rail has been pushed out of gage and deformed. The track deformity appears to be too close to positions 10,11, 12 to be the original point of derailment.
NTSB has yet to confirm the intended route of the train and the position of the east end switch as the train passed over it.
I'm not asking NTSB to announce the cause before it feels ready. I am asking NTSB to provide information necessary to eliminate certain possibilities that threaten the vitality of train operations, like an incongruity between signal indication and switch position. I think, and remember I'm a dinosaur, NTSB has an obligation to make such a determination (i.e the derailment was/was not the result of a vital failure in the means for authorizing movement) and communicate it to the public as soon as possible.
That's the second W.
Now W number 3: On November 18, 2021, 4 years after initiating/ending service using the Point Defiance Bypass, Amtrak intends to inaugurate scheduled service between Washington and Oregon over that portion of the railroad.
This time, says Amtrak, service resumes only after intensive system testing, crew qualification, safety certification, installation of PTC, implementation of Amtrak's Safety Management System, application of "step down" or graduated speed restrictions so the transition is less abrupt than the 50 mph deceleration from authorized MAS to authorized MAS, and an upgrade to simulator programs used to familiarize crews with the route and the equipment.
All those things are good things, are welcome things, even righteous things.
But just a couple of questions:
1. how? What are the details of the changes?
2. What immediate mitigating action does Amtrak's SMS require in the event of a PTC system outage affecting trains scheduled to operate over the bypass?
3. Have these improvements made necessary by and intended to satisfy system safety been migrated to other areas where Amtrak provides service?
That's more than a couple of questions, you say?
What on earth made you think that a dinosaur knows how to count?
David Schanoes
November 10, 2021
Who Am I?
First Clue: I dig rock and roll
Second Clue: I can do the twine and the jerk
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