Ten90 Solutions LLC

Just back from France, and fortified by 10 days worth of croissants, extra creamy butter, good wine, and fine food, I thought I'd chance watching the video record of NTSB's 10 July, Investigate Hearing: Managing Safety on Passenger Railroads.

The July 10 morning session centered on the February 4, 2018 collision of Amtrak #91 with a standing CSX freight train at Cayce, south Carolina.  The collision occurred in CTC territory where the signal system had been disabled in order to accommodate PTC upgrades.  The freight crew, switching between a  yard and a siding, across a main track,  failed to restore the main track switch to the proper position before releasing its control of the block to the dispatcher.  The freight crew effectively line the Amtrak into the siding and head on to the train they were constructing.  The Amtrak locomotive engineer and conductor were killed.

There is some good news to report coming out of the hearing and that good news is that CSX has changed its operating practices so that during a signal system suspension, where block signals are disabled and trains operate with track warrant authority, hand throw main track switches will be secured by the C&S department; that the switches will be locked with signal department locks; that train crews will not be able to unlike the switch; that use of the switch will require the presence and participation of a signal department employee; that train operations requiring the use of these switches will be curtailed during signal suspensions by minimizing industrial and/or switching operations, and that "meets" in single track territory will be scheduled for points outside the limits of the signal suspension. 

The thing about good news is that what makes it good, in this case and in many cases, is that it's better late than never.   Nothing prevented CSX from instituting these procedure prior to this fatal accident.... nothing but habit, inertia, and the belief that "nobody will ever make that mistake here.  The thing about mistakes is that anyone can, and does, make them anywhere, anytime. 

Now this bit of good news seems to have passed entirely over the heads of the NTSB board members, and maybe that's as it should be, because the board, after all, is concerned about safety, system-wide, industry-wide, and even sector-wide-- on a railroad, on all railroads, in the entire transportation industry.  This good news is limited  to CSX.   

Other railroads may have similar procedures in place.  Or not.  The "or not" is bad news, and that's where FRA is supposed to step in.  FRA has solicited public comment on a so-called Safety Advisory regarding operation of hand throw main track switches in territory where the signal system is disabled, seeking information on "industry best practices" so  FRA can-- no, not make best practices the minimum operating requirements-- advise other railroads on such practices.   

I know I sound cynical when I say that I don't see the point, but I don't.  And I am--cynical when it comes to safety advisories

FRA has in its past issued safety advisories, and it seems that such advisories have been, if not ignored, left unimplemented, which is not good news.  Good news is nowhere near good enough when it comes to safe train operations.   Effective regulation is the minimum safe standard.  If FRA cannot provide that, then it is not fulfilling its obligation under the law.

David Schanoes 

July 29 2018

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