Ten90 Solutions LLC

I watched the second half of the first day of the NTSB's public board meeeting examing railroad operating safety in light of the Amtrak accidents in Cayce, South Carolina, and Dupont, Washington.

I had, and have, a particular interest (but not prejudice) in the Washington (Point Defiance Bypass) accident.  The Point Defiance Bypass project was funded by a federal grant, under the Reinvestment and Recovery Act, to the Washington DOT for Amtrak to operate a more efficient Cascade Service over the railroad operated by Sound Transit, dispatched by the BNSF. 

Since the project was funded by the Feds, FRA was charged with overseeing the grant, and the parties to the grant to ensure the safe delivery of the project.   FRA's  Office of Railroad Safety, and specifically the passenger rail office, according to testimony at the meeting  "consult(s) directly with the grants manager, and any other stakeholder.   We provide technical assistance in addition to our safety oversight role...We are there to support the grant team and the execution of the contract.  We do this in two main ways.  We ensure compliance through field inspections but also through regulatory approvals. We also provide technical guidance and oversight." 

Got that?  I did.  I wanted to know if anyone if FRA took any exception to the curve at Dupont, where maximum authorized train speed fell from 79 mph to 30 mph, and the deceleration was not forced by any automatic apparatus.  I wondered if five years after the accident at Spuyten Duyvil and three years after the accident at Frankford Junction; if years after the multiple emergency orders and safety advisories, FRA actually participated in the safety management and hazard mitigation process that was, after all, being done on the federal dime. 

SPOILER ALERT:  The answer is "no," at least according to the testimony given on Tuesday.

The testimony by FRA officials made it clear that FRA never identified the specific curve as a location for catastrophic human error; that FRA's technical guidance does not include its own safety analysis of the intrinsic operating risks (prior to that catastrophic human failure, of course); and that neither Washington DOT nor Sound Transit specifically identified this curve (at MP 19.8) with its requirement for severe deceleration as a site for potential catastrophic human error.   

FRA testimony included the platitudes and boiler plate, "we depend on the railroad to assess and manage these risks.  They're the experts on their own railroad." Well yeah. Well nothing.  None of that means that you, FRA, in offering your technical and operational guidance, can't point the risk of the required deceleration; none of that means you can't point to your own safety advisories and suggest that the railroad find some better way, some method better than permanent speed restriction signs which are "miss one and you're done."  Nothing says you can't give guidance to establish a fixed wayside signal at the curve capable of displaying only one of  two aspects--- "stop" or "approach."  Nothing.  But that's what we have here-- nothing. 

Those of you accustomed to the railroad operating environment where life and death have somewhat greater immediacy than an alpha-numeric ranking on a risk table might view the video of the testimony and come away thinking that all those Powerpoint presentations with their hazard, risk, and mitigation matrices, are just busy work for those who don't realize that ticking off boxes is simply lining up the coffins.

David Schanoes 

July 12, 2018